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AVIATION RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND CHINA: ARE OPEN SKIES ON THE HORIZON?
ASHLEY RENEE BEANE*
I. INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE YOU ARE a product safety inspector for a pharma-
ceutical company in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, and you need
to travel to Shanghai to ensure that the labeling plant is being
properly maintained and report back to your U.S. superiors.
You will end up paying in excess of $2,000 for a round-trip,
economy class airline ticket and a small bag of nuts; and, if you
are lucky, the airline might also offer a soda. It is likely that your
flight will have to stop at least once before arriving in China,
probably in Chicago, Newark, or San Francisco, depending on
your very limited choice of airline.1 Due to the detailed bilateral
aviation agreement currently in force between the United States
and China, you must make your choice from the only four U.S.
airlines currently permitted to service international passenger
flights from the United States to China: American Airlines,
United Airlines, Continental Airlines, and Northwest Airlines. 2
Or imagine that you need to ship court documents and evi-
* Ashley Beane is a 2008 J.D. Candidate at Southern Methodist University.
Ashley holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Legal Studies from the University of
Texas at Arlington. Ashley wishes to thank her husband, Randall Beane, for his
loving support and understanding.
1 AMR Unit's Web Site Seeks Support for Bid, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2006, at D5.
2 Currently, American Airlines connects Chicago and Shanghai; Continental
Airlines flies from Newark, New Jersey to Beijing; United Airlines connects Chi-
cago and San Francisco to Beijing and Shanghai; and Northwest Airlines offers
flights to China with a stop in Tokyo. AMR Unit's Web Site Seeks Support for Bid,
supra note 1, at D5. Pending final approval from the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, United Airlines will begin a new nonstop route from Washington-Dul-
les International Airport and Beijing Capital International Airport on March 25,
2007, which will mark the first flight from Washington, D.C. to China, and signifi-
cantly, will connect the two capitals with direct flights just in time for the 2008
Olympic Games to be held in Beijing. Laura Meckler and Susan Carey, United
Wins Bid for First Nonstop Washington-China Route, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2007, at A2.
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dence exhibits overnight from Washington, D.C. to Beijing in
time for an important case to be handled by a partner in your
law firm tomorrow. According to the current bilateral agree-
ment between the United States and China, your choices for
shipping goods to China are Federal Express Corporation or
United Postal Service (UPS).'
Currently, more than forty percent of goods and services in
international trade, by value, travel by air, and in excess of forty
percent of people who cross national borders do so by air.4 But,
while most international trade is becoming increasingly deregu-
lated, many nations, including China,5 have remained fiercely
protective of their air transportation industries that facilitate in-
ternational trade by carrying those goods and services across the
globe. 6 Presently, bilateral aviation agreements made between
nations regulate much of the international aviation industry.7
No aircraft can conduct a single international flight unless the
two nations involved have reached a bilateral agreement, and
that agreement is complied with to the letter.8 It does not mat-
ter if all aircraft and airports involved are privately owned.9
Often, bilateral agreements explicitly state the number of air
carriers from each nation party to the agreement that may fly
between the two countries, along with a process by which the
nations may authorize new carriers to begin operation.'0 Also,
the routes that designated carriers are permitted to fly and the
frequency with which they may fly along the designated route(s)
are usually embodied in the bilateral agreement." There are
3 Michael K. Fung et al., The Air Cargo Industry in China: Implications of Globaliza-
tion and WTO Accession, TRANSP. J., Fall 2005, at 44, 56. The Department of Trans-
portation granted UPS the right to operate six weekly cargo flights to China
beginning in 2001. Rick Brooks and Stephen Power, UPS is Winner in Fierce Fight
to Serve China, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2000, at A3. Even with its improved position
in providing parcel-delivery service to China, UPS still trails Federal Express,
which has been operating direct cargo flights to China since 1995. Id.
4 Gerald L. Baliles, Fear of Flying: Aviation Protectionism and Global Growth, FOR-
EIGN AFF., May/June 1997, at 8. Gerald L. Baliles served during the early months
of the Clinton Administration as chairman of the National Airline Commission.
Gabriel S. Meyer, Note, U.S.-China Aviation Relations: Flight Path Toward Open
Skies?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 427, 435 (2002).
5 Editorial, Slow Plane to China, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2006, at A16.
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more than 1,200 such bilateral aviation agreements in force
around the globe today. 12
In 1946, the United States and Great Britain entered into the
first bilateral aviation agreement, which became a model agree-
ment that many other countries would use in formulating their
own air services agreements.' 3 Most early bilateral aviation
agreements were built on a quid pro quo basis, with nations seek-
ing to equalize the benefits accorded to each nation involved,' 4
such as veto rights over designated routes and airlines and influ-
ence over pricing schemes.1 5 Once Congress deregulated all
U.S. commercial airlines in 1978 pursuant to the Airline Der-
egulation Act,' 6 American air carriers had the freedom to ser-
vice any domestic market they chose.' 7 Since the deregulation
in 1978, U.S. commercial carriers have had to become increas-
ingly more innovative and efficient in order to compete for cus-
tomers with discount airlines' quality of service and low fares.18
The current system of gradual advancement through individ-
ual nation-to-nation bilateral agreements must be overhauled in
favor of broader "open skies" agreements to accommodate the
12 Id.
13 Id. at 9.
14 Id. Unlike the scheme adopted by the United States in an effort to increase
economic competition and therefore increase the benefits to consumers by way
of lower fares and higher-quality service, most bilateral aviation agreements only
involved a nation's single, government-sponsored (and usually heavily subsi-
dized) "flag carrier." Id.
15 Richard A. Snape, Productivity Comm'n, Austl., Regulating Services Trade:
Matching Policies to Objectives, Address Before the Eleventh Annual National
Bureau of Economic Research East Asian Seminar (June 22-24, 2000), available
at http://www.sitrends.org/images/articles/regulating%20services%20trade.pdf.
16 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 40101 et seq. (West 2007)).
17 Baliles, supra note 4, at 9.
18 Id. To promote greater efficiency, airlines began utilizing the hub-and-
spoke model of air travel and transport. The hub-and-spoke system gathers pas-
sengers from various destinations and flies them to a centralized hub airport,
where they can then board connecting flights to their ultimate destination. See
Seth Schiesel, In Frayed Networks, Common Threads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at
Gl. Porter Elliott, Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The Extraterritorial Application of United
States and European Community Competition Law in the Air Transport Sector, 31 GEO.
WASH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 185, 192-93 (1998). Advantages of the hub-and-spoke
model include the ability to provide air transportation to a large number of cities,
to funnel passengers onto larger aircraft for longer flights, and to dominate a
hub airport, creating considerable market power and the capability to charge
higher ticket fares. Jesse Hercules, Comment, Mixed Optimization: Diagnosis and
Proposed Solution for Several Problems in the Airline Industry, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 691,
695 (2006).
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rapidly growing needs of global aviation transportation. As na-
tions with deregulated airline industries have experienced sig-
nificantly increased productivity,' 9 nations which still regulate
their airline industries remain rather ineffectual by comparison
and are struggling to keep afloat in the global market, sacrific-
ing efficient commerce and international trade strategies in the
name of protecting their domestic airline industries and
workforces.20
The possibility of a liberal open skies agreement between the
United States and China in the near future is becoming more
likely. In recent years, the Chinese airline industry has made
significant gains in strength and efficiency. 21 China has become
increasingly open to topics ranging from personal freedoms to
international trade and cooperation,2 2 gradually adopting more
liberal trade and aviation agreements with the United States and
other nations. The Chinese government is becoming more
comfortable with opening itself up to free-market competition
with a national airline industry as powerful as that of the United
States.23
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the likelihood of
the United States and China entering into an open skies agree-
ment and the political and economic consequences and benefits
that such an agreement would have, or, in the alternative, the
likelihood of the United States and China expanding their cur-
rent bilateral aviation agreement to include fewer restrictions
and allow for more free competition between the two nations.
Trade and tourism between the United States and China de-
pend on successful air transportation relations between the two
nations. Part II gives a brief history of the Chinese aviation in-
dustry and the current trend toward deregulation. Part III ex-
plores the history of regulation and deregulation of the U.S.
airline industry, and the United States' attempt to spread the
trend of liberalization and deregulation in the international air-
line industry through bilateral open skies agreements. Part IV
discusses prior aviation agreements between the United States
19 In the eight years following the deregulation of the U.S. airlines, it is esti-
mated that consumers saved $6 billion due to increased competition among the
airlines, and it is estimated that the U.S. economy gains $15 billion per year as a
result of airline deregulation. Elliott, supra note 18, at 195.
20 Baliles, supra note 4, at 9.
21 See, infra text accompanying notes 48-69.
22 Thomas L. Friedman, The Five Myths, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at A31.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 53-62.
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and China, with a specific focus on the recent decision to allow
United Airlines to begin international service from Washington,
D.C. to Beijing-the first time the two capitals will be connected
by a non-stop flight. Finally, Part V discusses the likelihood of
China and the United States agreeing to the terms of an open
skies treaty, and the consequences such a decision would have
for each nation's airline industry.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE AVIATION
In 1949, the Chinese government created the Civil Aviation
Administration of China (CAAC) in order to facilitate the newly
formed country's enforcement of political, trade, and tourism
policies. 24 The CAAC initially operated as the nation's air force
department,25 and continued to operate in this capacity until
the late 1970s.2 6 The CAAC regulated every facet of the airline
industry-from safety, pilot training, and airworthiness, to air-
craft purchases and the ticket fares that could be charged.27 At
present, the CAAC only operates over the General Administra-
tion of Civil Aviation of China, which is in turn regulated by the
State Council of China (State Council) .28 For almost thirty
years, the CAAC functioned as both a regulatory body and a
commercial aviation entity, overseeing airline operation. 29 The
Chinese government overhauled the CAAC during the late
1970s, reforming its structure and clarifying its functions and
responsibilities."
24 Wu Jianduan & Xu Lining, Corporate Takeovers: Legal Aspects of Takeovers
Among Chinese Airlines, 68 J. AIR L. & CoM. 583, 606 (2003); Anming Zhang &
Hongmin Chen, Evolution of China's Air Transport Development and Policy Towards
International Liberalization, TRtNSP. J., Spring 2003, at 31.
25 Jianduan & Lining, supra note 24, at 606.
26 Zhang & Chen, supra note 24, at 32. As originally designed, the CAAC was a
four-tier administrative body, consisting of the "CAAC, six regional civil aviation
bureaus, twenty-three provincial civil aviation bureaus, and seventy-eight civil avi-
ation stations." Id.
27 Paul Lewis, China Demands CAAC Shake-Up, FLIGHT INT'L, Apr. 29, 1998, at
14. The CAAC also directly supervised all air transportation services, including
in-flight procedures, air traffic control, and airport management. Zhang &
Chen, supra note 24, at 32. All subordinate civil aviation entities were unable to
exercise independence in their managerial or logistical changes without prior
approval from the higher tiers of the CAAC body. Id. Each lower-level entity was
not held responsible for its individual profits or losses, but rather served as a
single cog in the overarching CAAC wheel. Id.
28 Jianduan & Lining, supra note 24, at 606.
29 Id. at 606-07.
30 Id. at 607; Zhang & Chen, supra note 24, at 32-33.
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Chinese airline industry reform occurred in three major
phases over the course of more than twenty-five years.3 1 The ini-
tial phase occurred between 1979 and 1986, as the Chinese gov-
ernment sought to instill more business sense into the airline
industry and to gradually reduce the prior centralized govern-
mental control over all facets of the industry.3 In 1982, the
CAAC administrative body was restructured, isolating the civil
aviation industry and its business concerns from the militaristic
focus of the air force. 33 The Chinese government divided the
civil aviation sector into nine airlines, each of which was author-
ized to fly domestic, international, or regional routes to Hong
Kong.34 Each airline incorporated under its own business li-
cense and began independently managing all facets of its opera-
tion. 5 Consequently, the government began to hold each of
the airlines responsible for its own losses and profits.36 The
CAAC transformed the duties of the regional, and later the pro-
vincial, civil aviation bureaus into entities primarily accountable
to the CAAC for reporting the profits and losses within their
respective sectors. 7 The CAAC began to allow the bureaus
greater autonomy in strategic decision-making in view of the
twin goals of maximizing profits and minimizing losses in the
airline business.38
The second phase of China's airline reform began in 1987,
when the State Council passed an airline reform program de-
signed to separate the authority to regulate the air industry from
the authority to directly operate all aspects of air transportation
31 See Zhang & Chen, supra note 24, at 32-33.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Jianduan & Lining, supra note 24, at 607.
35 Id.
36 Zhang & Chen, supra note 24, at 31.
37 Id.
38 Id. Prior to these reforms, the Chinese airline industry was well-known for
its under-usage of aircraft, with Chinese airlines using their airplanes at usage
levels less than half of comparable airlines in other nations. Murray Bailey, IATA
Report Gives Alternative Insight into Mainland Aviation, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 8, 1994, at 6. Most national airlines strive for efficient flight times and high
usage levels to generate high revenue levels. Id. Such efficiency is strongly corre-
lated to regular and preventive maintenance of aircraft. Id. In recent years there
has been some improvement in overall usage levels, but the Chinese airlines still
operate at usage levels ten to twenty percent lower than the airlines of other
Asian nations. Id.
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service.39 The State Council sought to streamline the four-tier
CAAC system into a two-tier system, establish six government-
sponsored regional airlines, and to encourage the entry of new
carriers into the domestic market.4 ° In an effort to facilitate new
market entry, the CAAC also simplified the existing procedural
requirements for route approval, and quickly approved many
airlines' requests for routes and aircraft.4" As a result, the num-
ber of routes more than tripled during the period from 1980 to
1992.42
China's third phase of airline reform came in 1993, when the
Chinese government decided to shift its focus to consolidating
the airline industry rather than its previous focus of easing mar-
ket entry and increasing competition.4 3 As a result of the sec-
ond phase of reform, which encouraged newcomer air carriers
to enter the market, the Chinese airline industry became inun-
dated with forty-one air carriers, most of which were small, local,
and ultimately unprofitable. 44 The CAAC ceased approving ap-
plications for new airlines to begin service and also re-examined
the qualifications and profitability of existing carriers.45 This
process eventually led to extensive mergers throughout the in-
dustry, most notably the consolidation of the CAAC airlines into
the "big three," led by Air China, China Eastern, and China
Southern.46
On October 30, 1995, at the Sixteenth Meeting of the Stand-
ing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress, the
Civil Aviation Law of the People's Republic of China (Civil Avia-
39 Zhang & Chen, supra note 24, at 33. This division of authority was necessary
in order to break up the monopoly possessed by the CAAC over both the national
regulations for the air industry and the day-to-day operations of each individual
air carrier. Id.
40 Id. Most new carriers entering the market as a result of this reform were not
directly affiliated with the CAAC, and in general, enjoyed greater growth and
overall productivity in subsequent years than CAAC carriers, especially with re-




44 Id. Many such airlines were losing money very quickly and remained in op-
eration solely by virtue of generous government subsidies, primarily on the local
level. Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. These three major carriers were subsequently given greater autonomy
and flexibility in such areas as the appointment of managerial officials, the fixing
and changing of prices in response to market conditions, and the ability to buy or
lease aircraft (although still subject to relatively arduous CAAC approval proce-
dures). Id.
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tion Law) was adopted, effective March 1, 1996." The purpose
of the Civil Aviation Law was to protect the rights of those par-
ties involved in the Chinese civil aviation industry, to ensure the
safety of civil aviation operations both within and outside of
China, and to promote China's civil aviation industry within the
country itself.48 Unlike many market-driven developed nations,
China's aviation industry is still largely in the process of develop-
ing. A major goal for the industry is a smooth transition that will
be beneficial to the entire Chinese society.49
In an effort to expand national and international business en-
deavors, China has increasingly opened its airline industry to
the rest of the world. 51 In May 1994, China began allowing for-
eign air carriers to invest in Chinese airlines and to cooperate
with the Chinese in creating joint-enterprise airline
companies.5 1
Prior to the Civil Aviation Law, China's civil aviation industry
operated under an amalgamation of hundreds of administrative,
economic, and technical regulations promulgated by the CAAC
and China's State Council. 52 However, these regulations were
ill-suited to accommodate the growing needs of the civil aviation
industry-both within China and internationally-due to their
narrow scope and poor implementation. 53 The recent Civil Avi-
ation Law was enacted to provide a flexible system of rules and
47 Wu Jianduan, A Milestone of Air Legislation in China-Some Thoughts, on the
Civil Aviation Law of the People's Republic of China, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 823, 823
(1997). This Civil Aviation Law is the first national legislation concerning
China's civil aviation industry in forty-six years. Id. at 824. In essence, this Civil
Aviation Law codifies and summarizes the advancements and practices put into
force in China over the last forty-six years. Id.
48 Id. at 823.
49 Id. at 839-40.
50 Id. at 835. In December of 1995, George Soros, an international investor,
became the first foreign investor in the Chinese airline market when he pur-
chased a twenty-five percent stake in Hainan Airlines, a small regional airline in
southern China, for $25 million. China Opens Its Airlines to Foreign Investment,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1995. China Eastern Airlines, based in Shanghai, and China
Southern Airlines, based in Guangzhou, began listing shares on the New York
Stock Exchange in 1997. Id.; Press Release, PR Newswire, Trading of H Shares of
China Eastern Airlines Corporation Limited in Hong Kong is Suspended (Nov. 8,
2007) (on file with author), available at http://money.cnn.com/news/new-
sfeeds/articles/prnewswire/CLTH06108112007-1.htm.
5i Jianduan, supra note 47, at 835. Foreign investment in Chinese airlines and
in the joint enterprises is capped at thirty-five percent of the airline's total capital
and twenty-five percent of the voting rights in any particular airline. Id.
52 Id. at 840.
53 Id.
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regulations to comprehensively accommodate the dynamic and
continuing needs of China's civil aviation industry and to facili-
tate trade with other nations and further assimilate the Chinese
economy into the international scheme.54
Until 1997, all Chinese airline carriers were government-
owned.55 However, in 1997, China Southern and China Eastern
became publicly traded companies on the New York and Hong
Kong stock exchanges. 56 Air China followed suit and went pub-
lic in 2004, with listings on the London and Hong Kong
exchanges. 57
Prior to 2002, the CAAC controlled the majority of the Chi-
nese aviation industry through ten major carriers under its di-
rect control.58 However, in April of 2001, the CAAC decided to
direct a consolidation of the ten carriers under its control into
three large groups, 59 headed by China Southern, China Eastern,
and China's unofficial flag carrier, Air China.60 Prior to consoli-
dation, most of China's aviation industry consisted of small-scale
airlines which cost more to operate than they were able to make
in profit.61 In order for China's aviation industry to compete at
a level on par with the rest of the world, the Chinese govern-
ment decided to consolidate the industry into a few large air-
lines and direct a reallocation of resources, with the goal of
54 Id.
55 Air China Serves Up Lucrative Deal for Four U.S. Carriers, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS,
May 15, 1998, at 1.
56 Id.
57 Press Release, London Stock Exch., The London Stock Exchange is De-
lighted to Welcome Air China to the Main Market (Dec. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/about/cooverview/thesource/
thesourcenewsarchive/15122004airchina.html.
58 Nicholas Ionides, China Confirms Final Approval for Mammoth Restructuring,
AIR TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 6, 2002.
59 Id.; Mergers Between Chinese Carriers to Take About Two Years, AIRLINE INDUS.
INFO., May 14, 2001.
60 Tighter Formations: Civil Aviation Administration to Merge Services, CHINAON-
LINE, Jan. 8, 2001. Pursuant to the consolidation plan, China Southern merged
with China Northern and Xinjiang Airlines, forming the largest fleet of 180 air-
craft; Air China merged with China Southwest Airlines and China National Avia-
tion Corporation, resulting in a 118-aircraft fleet; and China Eastern merged with
Northwest Airlines and Yunnan Airlines, resulting in a fleet 118 aircraft strong.
China's "Big Three" Ready for Airline Mergers, CNN.coM, http://archives.cnn.com/
2002/BUSINESS/asia/02/05/china.aviation.biz/index.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2007). See also Mergers Between Chinese Carriers, supra note 59.
61 China to Launch Strategic Reshuffle of Aviation Sector, ASIA PULSE, Aug. 21, 2000.
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lowering overall operating costs and increasing the industry's
profitability.6
2
In recent years, the Chinese government has attempted to
bolster the aviation industry through deregulation of the na-
tion's three government-sponsored air carriers-Air China,
China Eastern Airlines, and China Southern Airlines. 6 The
Chinese government's stated goal in deregulating the airlines is
to foster a more efficient airline industry, one that will be able to
successfully compete in the ever-growing international air trans-
portation market.64 However, some Chinese airline executives
are not quite so confident, fearing that the lack of a government
support-cushion may result in the same fate that has recently
befallen the deregulated airlines of the United States and many
European nations-bankruptcy. 65 China's "big three" airlines
are already walking a tight-rope in an effort to balance their am-
bitions to increase domestic and international operations while
simultaneously being forced by the government to merge with
smaller regional air carriers in an effort to consolidate and
strengthen the airline industry.
66
Since 2002, China's airline industry has experienced a trans-
formation from numerous regional state-owned carriers to a na-
tional industry with a tremendous presence in the global
aviation market. 67 The three major air carriers have submitted
initial public offerings and have placed heavy emphasis on the
62 Id. Also, the Chinese government stated that it hoped the merger would
foster competition among the three largest domestic airlines and place enough
power behind these consolidated airlines so that China could truly compete in
the international aviation market. Ionides, supra note 58; Choice of Partners Puts
Brake on Airline Shake-up, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 26, 2001, at 1.
63 Bruce Stanley, China's Airlines Take Test Flight-Beijing Sees Carrier's Deregula-
tion as Bellwether of Life in WTO, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2005, at All. As of 2003,
China Southern Airlines controlled 33.6 percent of the shares of China's air-pas-
senger market, with Air China controlling 26.8 percent of the market and China
Eastern Airlines controlling 21.8 percent of the market. Id.
64 See Robert Thomson, China Revamps Its Creaking National Airline, FIN. TIMES,
July 1, 1988, at 4. China's air-passenger traffic has increased dramatically in the
past twenty-five years, growing from 3.4 million passengers per year in 1980 to in
excess of 120 million passengers by 2004. Stanley, supra note 63, at All.
65 Stanley, supra note 63, at All.
66 Id.
67 Id. Despite recent advancements, remnants of government control still re-
main in place. Chinese airlines still must purchase their fuel at prices set by a
government agency; the Chinese military continues to place restrictions on do-
mestic air space; and Chinese air carriers must fly both international and domes-
tic flights at predetermined altitudes, even if another altitude would be more
fuel-efficient. Id.
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safety, age, and reliability of their aircraft, which were sources of
international and domestic concern in prior years. 68 To stay via-
ble in the international passenger market, China's airlines have
been forced to modernize both the in-flight accommodations
they provide for their first- and business-class passengers and the
quality of aircraft they choose to purchase and employ. 69 Be-
cause of the Chinese government's ban on importation of petro-
leum products, the high cost of petroleum within mainland
China, which averages some fifty percent higher than the cost in
other nations, has been a major setback in international ad-
vancement of the Chinese airline industry.70 Fuel costs alone
regularly account for more than nineteen percent of each Chi-
nese airline's operating costs.
71
Since 2005, Chinese airlines have been permitted much more
latitude in controlling the industry than in the past. 72 For exam-
ple, each Chinese airline may set its own fares and plan its own
domestic and international routes, and airlines may sell portions
of their stock to foreign investors. 73 However, a major obstacle
still stands in the way of the Chinese airline industry becoming a
dominant player in the international air passenger market: the
inability of Chinese airlines to purchase their own aircraft.
7 4
Under the current system, in order for a Chinese air carrier to
purchase aircraft, the airline must (1) negotiate with an aircraft
manufacturer such as Airbus or Boeing, (2) draft a "wish list" of
aircraft it wishes to buy, (3) submit the request list to the CAAC,
and (4) wait months, or even years, for CAAC officials to ap-
prove the request, in whole or in part, or to deny the request
altogether.7 5 Even when this arduous process is completed, Chi-
nese airlines often do not receive the amount of airplanes re-
quested.76 Because of the length of the current process,
Chinese air carriers are unable to efficiently and appropriately
68 Id. China is now considered by many international aircraft manufacturers to
be the fastest-growing market for passenger airplanes in the world. Id.
69 Id.
70 Joseph Lo, Further Consideration on Way for Key Carriers, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 16, 1999, at 5.
71 Id.
72 Bruce Stanley, China's Not-Quite-Free Skies-Carriers Set Fares, Sell Stock, But Beij-
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respond to dynamic market conditions.77 The productivity of
the Chinese airlines is also hampered by government-sponsored
monopolies on jet fuel and ticket sales. 78 By retaining control
over these segments of the airline industry, the government pre-
vents carriers from increasing their capacity beyond the demand
for their passenger services. 79 Safety is also a factor in govern-
ment retention of control.80 During the rapid expansion of the
industry in the 1980s and 1990s, many Chinese airlines could
not adequately train pilots fast enough to keep pace, and the
consequence was a horrific string of aircraft crashes resulting in
hundreds of deaths.8 1
The Chinese government also intends to retain control over
these segments of the airline industry in order to maximize the
bargaining power of all the nation's airlines in negotiating with
aircraft manufacturers and foreign governments. 8 2 According
to Joseph Massey, assistant U.S. trade representative for Japan
and China from 1985 to 1992, and current director of the
Center for International Business at the Dartmouth College
Tuck School of Business, "[f]rom the [Chinese] government's
perspective, one of the levers that they have with the United
States and with Europe is the contest between Airbus and Boe-
ing .... If they were to let the individual airlines make all the
77 Id.
78 Id. The Chinese government's control over three significant components of
the airline industry-fuel price, ticket price, and aircraft purchasing-leaves the
airlines with no measurable control over the amount of greater than half of their
total overhead and operating costs. Id.
79 Id. As Li Wei Jian, former executive president of China's Hainan Airlines
stated, "The airlines order more than they need, and the government knows that.
It's like a game." Id. Xiamen Airlines President Wu Rongnan agrees: "Even
though I have the discipline not to order too many aircraft at a time, I don't trust
others to show the same discipline." Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. The CAAC was often accused of being more interested in profit from
airline services than in passenger safety; for many years, aircraft crews did not
give any safety briefings on flights and no oxygen masks, life jackets, or emer-
gency procedure pamphlets were provided, and many airlines do not follow
maintenance and servicing schedules that would be acceptable to foreign na-
tions. Michael Weisskopf, China's No Frills Airline; Flying Fossils Fray Nerves of the
Intrepid, WASH. POST, June 13, 1983, at Al. At Beijing Capital International Air-
port, ground crews are notorious for refusing to put out their cigarettes during
refueling, and Chinese airlines are well-known for losing luggage, so many Chi-
nese passengers refuse to check any of their bags, resulting in clogged aisles on
the airplanes which would make a quick and safe exit impossible. Patrick E.
Tyler, Eye on Olympics, China Pursues Air Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at A13.
82 China's Not-Quite-Free Skies, supra note 72, at A6.
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purchasing decisions, think of the negotiating leverage they
would lose." 3
III. U.S. AVIATION HISTORY: FROM THE CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD TO DEREGULATION AND
OPEN SKIES
The U.S. air transportation industry owes its initial technologi-
cal advancement opportunities, and indeed its survival during its
early years, to profits and subsidies earned from carrying and
delivering the U.S. mail.84 Beginning in 1925, the United States
adopted the European model of extensive government regula-
tion of the airline industry, from control over ticket fares, merg-
ers, and acquisitions, to the screening of applicant airlines who
wished to enter the domestic and international markets.85 The
Air Commerce Act of 192686 granted jurisdiction over aviation
safety to the Secretary of Commerce, gave the Secretary the au-
thority to investigate any accidents associated with the airlines,
and restricted the percentage of foreign ownership of U.S. air
carriers. 87
From its inception pursuant to the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, until the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978,
the Civil Aeronautics Authority, 88 later renamed the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB), regulated all essential aspects of the inter-
state air transportation industry-supervising mergers and
acquisitions, setting ticket fares and permissible flight routes,
and screening new air carriers who wished to enter the U.S. mar-
ket.89 Government subsidies and centralized regulation pro-
83 Id.
84 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L. J. 235,
276-77 (2003). These first airmail contracts determined the routes that airlines
continued to follow for decades. Id.
85 Elliott, supra note 18, at 190.
86 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C.A. §§ 171-184 (West 2007)).
87 Dempsey, supra note 84, at 278.
88 Id. at 280. Congress established the Civil Aeronautics Authority during the
Great Depression to regulate and subsidize the suffering air transportation indus-
try as part of an overall effort to strengthen the national infrastructure. Id. at
280-81, 288. "Transportation is of such vital importance to the public welfare...
that some measure of government regulation is ... necessary." Id. at 289.
89 Elliott, supra note 18, at 190. The CAB, as an agency created by the federal
government, had no authority to regulate intrastate air transportation, resulting
in intrastate air commerce being regulated, if at all, by each state in its individual
discretion. Id. Neither did the CAB have jurisdiction over frequency of flights,
type of aircraft, or scheduling. Dempsey, supra note 84, at 290.
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vided the airline industry with greater stability and allowed the
industry to survive the Great Depression and to recover from
major economic losses. ° Under this adaptable system of eco-
nomic regulation, the U.S. airline industry simultaneously en-
hanced its efficiency, cost-effectiveness, safety record, and
overall productivity, generating an air transportation industry
unsurpassed at that time.91 Positive outlooks for the industry be-
gan to turn dismal by the 1970s-a result of extensive invest-
ment and aircraft capacity outstripping passenger demand
coupled with the fuel crisis emerging out of the Arab Oil Em-
bargo of 1973.92 In response, the CAB asserted greater regula-
tory involvement in the airline industry to prevent its feared
collapse,93 and successfully rescued the airline industry from its
eventual demise94 once again.
During the late 1970s, the political tides turned as airlines be-
came increasingly frustrated with the complicated and time-con-
suming process of complying with the CAB's regulations.
Consumers were generally dissatisfied with the consequential in-
creases in ticket prices and lack of efficiency and service op-
tions. 5 Many Americans began to feel that an unregulated
airline industry, which would foster competition in pricing, ser-
vice, and safety, would better serve both the airlines and the
American public. 6
The outrageously high fares and generally inefficient opera-
tion of U.S. airlines during the 1970s made deregulation of the
airline industry a lively topic of political debate.9 7 Supporters of
regulation voiced the fear that lack of government regulation of
the airline industry would lead to somewhat cheaper fares at the
unreasonably high cost of passenger safety. 8 Proponents of der-
egulation argued that the auspices of the CAB were far too in-
trusive and that deregulation would greatly increase
90 Dempsey, supra note 84, at 291-92.
91 Id. at 312.
92 Id. at 313.
93 Id. The CAB ceased reviewing new route proposals, instituted aircraft capac-
ity limitations to reduce traffic in major regional and national markets, and per-
mitted the airlines to pass a portion of their increased fuel costs on to the
passengers through raised fares. Id.
94 See Richard D. Cudahy, The Airlines: Destined to Fail?, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 3,
8-9 (2006).
95 Dempsey, supra note 84, at 329.
96 Id. at 330.
97 Elliott, supra note 18, at 190-91.
98 Id.
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competition and provide the dominant airlines with the incen-
tives to lower fares, increase efficiency, and make an effort to
enhance overall passenger satisfaction."
A major milestone in the history of the U.S. aviation industry
occurred when Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978,100 allowing U.S. airlines to begin directly competing with
one another with minimal government intervention.10 1 The Air-
line Deregulation Act provided for the termination of the
CAB, °102 making the CAB the first major federal agency to be
extinguished in U.S. history. 103 The American public now had
the power to decide which airlines would succeed and which
would fail based on each airline's characteristics, most notably
the convenience of routes, both domestic and international, and
ticket prices.104
In the first few years following deregulation, the number of
passenger air carriers in the United States nearly tripled.'0 5 The
increased competition among the airlines provided passengers
not only with greater choices in air service, but also fares at sub-
stantially lower prices than those previously offered through air-
lines touting "no frills" service. 106 Initially, offering lower fares
allowed newcomer air carriers to compete with the more estab-
lished incumbent carriers, but the resilient larger airlines
adapted to the increase in competition by retaining their added
amenities while simultaneously matching the lower fares of
smaller airlines with regard to certain routes and flight times. 107
As a result, many of the smaller carriers were unable to realize a
99 Id. This view eventually led to the endorsement of the further liberalization
of the aviation industry across the globe-the "open skies" view. Id.
100 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
101 Chuck Y. Gee, Aviation and Tourism: The Traveling Public, 20 TRANSP. L. J. 1,
3 (1991).
102 Dempsey, supra note 84, at 336. While the Act eventually received extensive
support from both major political parties and a majority of the American public,
one airline executive admitted that forty years of CAB regulation had produced
an efficient, productive, and profitable aviation industry envied by the rest of the
world. Id. at 337.
103 Id. at 336. The Act transferred the limited remaining responsibilities of the
CAB to the U.S. Department of Transportation, effective January 1, 1985. Id. at
339-400.
104 Gee, supra note 101, at 3.
105 Id.
106 Id. It is estimated that deregulation resulted in passenger savings of more
than six billion dollars, even taking into account the yearly cost to passengers
attributable to increased flight delays. Id.
107 Id. at 4.
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profit, and they had little choice other than to allow the more
established carriers to take over their routes or to file for bank-
ruptcy.l°8 Consequently, the U.S. airline industry was left even
more consolidated than it had been prior to the Airline Deregu-
lation Act of 1978.109
Following deregulation, major airlines strengthened their op-
erations through refinement of the "hub-and-spoke" model.110
Within this model, airlines establish various "hubs" at central air-
ports which are fed by a network of "spokes" that span the air-
line's coverage area.1 ' If expanded to global proportions, this
method of networking, combined with airline liberalization and
deregulation, could provide enormous benefits for producers
and consumers in the international air transportation market.1 2
The success of U.S. airline deregulation from the perspective
of the American consumer is widely accepted, but the benefits
of deregulation for the industry, especially the smaller air carri-
ers, are debatable. 1 3 While deregulation stimulated the crea-
tion of new jobs, a rise in the wages of airline employees, and
decreased passenger air fares, 4 critics argue that the increased
competition and domination of the industry by the handful of
major airlines has replaced the arduous regulations of the CAB,
and the barriers to entry into the airline transportation market
are now more apparent than ever. 115
Since U.S. airline deregulation has been perceived as an over-
all success, the United States has attempted to extend its airline
liberalization ideals on an international level, discouraging the
use of restrictive, bilateral agreements in favor of broader, less
regulatory open skies agreements. 11 6 However, many nations
have been reluctant to enter into such agreements with a market
force as powerful as the U.S. airline industry, fearing that their
108 Elliott, supra note 18, at 192.
00 Gee, supra note 101, at 4. Currently, the largest airlines control ninety-five
percent of the entire U.S. aviation industry, resulting in a resurgence of higher
prices and little choice for consumers. Id.
110 Daniel C. Hedlund, Toward Open Skies: Liberalizing Trade in International Air-
line Services, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 259, 282-83 (1994).
111 Id. The airlines attempt to schedule flights arriving at the hub from the
various spokes at approximately the same time, so that passengers can transfer
easily to their respective connecting flights. Id. at 282.
112 Id. at 283.
113 Id.; Elliot, supra note 18, at 194.
114 Hedlund, supra note 110, at 283.
115 Elliott, supra note 18, at 194.
116 Hedlund, supra note 110, at 284.
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less powerful air carriers would not be able to compete on a
level that would make the agreements beneficial to them." 7
Many nations have expressed concerns that open skies agree-
ments, as opposed to bilateral agreements, would threaten not
only the economic viability of their air carriers, but also non-
economic factors such as national safety and sovereignty." 8
IV. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES-CHINA
AVIATION RELATIONS
U.S. airlines began vying for routes to China when diplomatic
negotiations resumed between the two nations in January of
1979." Even though the United States and the People's Re-
public of China had not yet reached a formal bilateral air ser-
vices agreement, U.S. airlines were already reviewing strategies
and preparing to propose arguments for the anticipated U.S.-
China routes. 120 In 1979, three U.S. airlines, Pan American,
Trans World Airlines, and Northwest Orient Airlines, had the
authority to service routes to mainland China, but their author-
ity had been dormant since the CAB decided several years
before to delay any action on the authority until the diplomatic
situation between the two countries changed.121 Pan American
and Northwest Orient were expected to be the front-runners for
the new routes available pursuant to the anticipated agreement,
since both offered U.S.-China passenger airline service in 1949,
when service ceased due to the establishment of the People's
Republic of China by the Communist Party.122 United Airlines,
Trans International Airlines, and World Airways also submitted
applications to service China pursuant to the anticipated bilat-
eral aviation agreement. 123 The main focus of each airline's ap-
117 Id. at 284-88.
118 Id. at 284. Many Asian nations also feel that the United States has not yet
negotiated more liberal agreements because the terms of the current bilateral
agreements are disproportionately favorable to U.S. air carriers. Garrick L.H.
Goo, Deregulation and Liberalization of Air Transport in the Pacific Rim: Are They Ready
for America's "Open Skies"?, 18 U. HAW. L. REv. 541, 552 (1996).
119 Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, U.S. Carriers Compete for Routes to China, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Jan. 1, 1979, at 25.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Jay Mathews, Ist U.S.-China Flights Since '49 Approved, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
1980, at E2. Pan American began operating the first flights from the United
States to China in 1935. Wallace Turner, Scheduled Air Service from China to U.S.
Resumes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1981, at A16.
123 Lenorovitz, supra note 119, at 25.
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plication seemed to be the construction and operation of
international hotel chains in China as an attempt by China to
broaden their tourist industry. 124
In 1980, The People's Republic of China and the United
States signed a bilateral aviation agreement, 125 providing for the
first direct commercial airline service between the two nations
since 1949.126 The agreement sharply diverged from U.S. prac-
tice by initially only allowing one U.S. airline to participate in
the first two years of operation under the agreement.127 While
the agreement only provided for one U.S. flight and one Chi-
nese flight per week initially,128 the agreement provided for a
second airline from each country to be allowed to fly the speci-
fied routes-and possibly additional routes-in later years. 129 At
least seven airlines applied for the initial route.13 ° The United
States government selected Pan American World Airways as the
first U.S. airline to operate under the new aviation agreement,
and Pan American began service from New York to Tokyo and
Peking on January 28, 1981.13 Under the agreement, the first
ever scheduled U.S.-China flights originating from China began,
with the CAAC offering service from Peking to San Francisco
and New York. 13 2
In 1983, Pan American, the only U.S. carrier flying to China at
the time, announced it would begin offering service from Tokyo
124 Id.
125 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the People's Republic of China Relating to Civil Air Trans-
port, U.S.-P.R.C., Sept. 8, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 4559 [hereinafter 1980 Agreement].
126 International Report: China Flights, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Sept. 9,
1980.
127 Mathews, supra note 122, at E2.
128 Id.
129 International Report: China Fights, supra note 126. The 1980 agreement in-
cluded an amendment process by which new routes could be negotiated by the
two nations, and if agreed upon, added to the terms of the agreement. See 1980
Agreement, supra note 125, art. XVII.
130 Mathews, supra note 122, at E2.
131 Turner, supra note 122, at A16. Pan Am subsequently began offering flights
from San Francisco to Tokyo, Shanghai, and Peking on January 31, 1981, and
flights from New York began on April 26, 1981, with stops in Tokyo and Shang-
hai. Id. See Fox Butterfield, China's Majestic Huang Shan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1981,
§ 10 at 1; Suzanne Donner, Vacationing at an Overseas University, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 1981, § 10 at 9.
132 Turner, supra note 122, at A16.
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to Taipei.' 3 Pan American was motivated to begin offering
Taipei service for two reasons.'34 First, Pan American was exper-
iencing low passenger rates on its San Francisco to Beijing
flights, largely due to decreased trade between the United States
and China during the early 1980s and increased competition
with Air China, China's official airline." 5 Second, Pan Ameri-
can stood to gain an estimated fifteen to twenty million dollars
in potential profits from the Tokyo-Taipei route.'36
Upon learning of Pan American's new Taipei service, Chinese
officials demanded that the United States designate another air-
line that did not service Taiwan to replace Pan American's air-
line service to China.'37 This demand threatened to disrupt the
tenuous alliance between the two nations' airline industries
since Pan American's express commitment to discontinue air-
line service to Taipei was a critical factor in China's approval of
Pan American as the first U.S. airline to operate air service to
China in nearly thirty years.'38
The U.S. government refused, accusing China of interfering
in U.S. domestic affairs-a claim often made by China against
the United States.'39 The United States also argued that the avi-
ation agreement granting Pan American rights to fly to China
would require the United States to revoke the air service rights
of China's official air carrier if Pan American's landing rights
were revoked. 4 ' This would result in China losing its busy and
highly profitable U.S. route and would leave China with expen-
sive equipment that it would be unable to employ elsewhere.' 14
In the end, China only imposed one rather minor restriction-
Pan American could no longer fly over south China. Pan Ameri-
can, however, continued serving both mainland China and
Taiwan.' 42
13 JOHN F. COOPER, HERITAGE FOUND., ASIAN STUDIES BACKGROUNDER No. 4,





137 China Demands Replacement of Pan Am with Another Airline to Fly Sino-U.S.
Route, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, June 16, 1983.
138 Id.
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After the initial 1980 agreement, expansion of U.S.-China avi-
ation service was very gradual,143 with significant liberalization
occurring in the 1992 amendments to the treaty.144 The 1992
amendments permitted the U.S. and Chinese airlines to negoti-
ate code-sharing agreements,1 5 which stimulated the coordina-
tion of flight schedules to aid passengers in connecting flights
and improved customer service through simplification of the
reservation process and coordination among the airlines' fre-
quent-flyer programs and benefits.1 46 The U.S.-China treaty was
again amended in 1996 (1996 Agreement), 47 leading to further
expansion of code-sharing possibilities and the first authorized
nonstop U.S.-China flight operated by Northwest Airlines. 148
The 1996 Agreement allowed code-sharing between U.S. and
Chinese airlines to service five cities in each country that were
not currently serviced by direct flights.149 At this time, United
Airlines and Northwest Airlines dominated most routes to
China, usually via Tokyo or Hong Kong, since they were "the
only two U.S. airlines with nearly unlimited access to Tokyo."' 50
Through Tokyo, United Airlines already flew fourteen flights
143 For many years, arguments for international routes were heard in adminis-
trative courts, with the judge making a public recommendation about who
should be awarded the route and an official at the Department of Transportation
making the final decision, but the airlines and officials claimed that this system
was unwieldy and inefficient. Anna Wilde Mathews & Helene Cooper, "Demand to
Land": U.S. Airlines Pull Out the Stops in Lobbying for New China Route-Pitches for
Coveted Flights are Intense but Require the Indirect Approach-"Oh, Let's Not Go There,"
WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2000, at Al. In the late 1980s, the Department of Transpor-
tation, in an attempt to simplify the process, began requiring airlines and other
interested parties to submit their arguments through paper exhibits, which are
considered by Department officials who make an ultimate decision. Id. This de-
cision may be challenged in federal court. Id. The entire process is designed to
prevent direct lobbying by airlines and to allow Department officials to make a
determination conforming to the public interest. Id.
144 See Agreement Amending the Agreement of September 17, 1980 as
amended, U.S.-P.R.C., Feb. 10, 1992, T.I.A.S. No. 12448, available at 1992 WL
877265.
145 "Under code-sharing arrangements, one airline sells seats on another air-
line's flights under its own name." Don Phillips, U.S., China Sign Pact on Direct
Flights; Agreement to Link Detroit and Beijing, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1995, at A19.
146 Meyer, supra note 4, at 444-45.
147 Agreement Amending the Air Transport Agreement of September 17,
1980, As Amended, U.S.-P.R.C., Mar. 27, 1996, Temp. State Dep't No. 04-569,
available at 1996 WL 33670739.
148 Meyer, supra note 4, at 445.
149 Phillips, supra note 145, at A19.
150 Id.
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per week to Beijing and Shanghai. 5 ' Prior to the 1996 agree-
ment, Northwest Airlines flew seven flights per week to China
through Tokyo, and the agreement allowed Northwest Airlines
three direct flights from Detroit to Beijing the current year,
1997, and two additional direct flights beginning in 1998.152
Without these advantages in Tokyo, "American Airlines and
Delta Air Lines are the U.S. carriers most likely to take advan-
tage of code-sharing arrangements.' 1 53 The 1996 Agreement
also allowed Federal Express Corporation (Federal Express) to
increase its number of flights per week to China from two to
four,55 and provided for other U.S. airlines to begin talks with
the Chinese government to set up additional routes between the
United States and China.'
155
Beginning in 1996, Northwest Airlines began direct flights
from Detroit to Beijing, and eventually would offer nine non-
stop flights per week, the first nonstop service between the
United States and China. 156 Federal Express was granted four
direct cargo flights per week into China.1 57 China Southern Air-
lines, based in Guangzhou, also began nonstop flights in
1996.158 At the time, Northwest Airlines already flew to Beijing
three times per week and to Shanghai once per week, but all
such flights had to stop in Tokyo. 159 The 1996 Agreement gave
Northwest Airlines an additional five frequencies from Detroit
to Beijing, three to begin in April of 1996, and two to begin in
1998.160 In May of 1996, Air China and Northwest Airlines also
agreed to begin code-sharing and cooperating in future market
promotions.1 6' Northwest Airlines also planned to become the
first U.S. airline to offer service to Guangzhou, replacing North-
west flights currently bound for Shanghai.'6 2
15' Northwest and Air China Link, ASIAN AVIATION NEWS, May 3, 1996.
152 Id.
153 Phillips, supra note 145, at A19.
154 U.S. and China Sign Accord on Flights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1995, at 54.
155 Id.
156 Phillips, supra note 145, at A19.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Nicholas Ionides, U.S. and China Agree on More Flights; Accord Sets Up Talks on
New Routes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 1, 1996, at 5.
160 Id.
161 Nicholas lonides, Air China and Northwest Tie Historic Deal, S. CHINA MORN-
INC POST (H.K.), May 1, 1996, at 5.
162 Id.
2007] 823
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
In 1998, Northwest Airlines and China's largest international
air carrier, Air China, signed an exclusive cooperation agree-
ment agreeing that Air China would not sign cooperation agree-
ments with any other U.S. airline.'63 United Airlines had been
strongly vying to secure an alliance with Air China, but ulti-
mately lost out to Northwest Airlines.'64 Earlier in 1998, China's
second and third largest international carriers, China Southern
and China Eastern signed similar, but less extensive, coopera-
tion agreements with Delta Air Lines and American Airlines, re-
spectively.' 65 The Delta-China Southern and American-China
Eastern agreements only allow for code-sharing between the
U.S. and Chinese airlines on specific routes between the two na-
tions.166 The Air China-Northwest Airlines affiliation will com-
mand 65.5 percent of nonstop U.S.-China routes and 98.7
percent of the "one-stop market"'167 due to Air China's antici-
pated merger with several smaller regional airlines and the com-
bined effort of Northwest Airlines and its three domestic
partners, America West Airlines, Continental Airlines, and
Alaska Airlines.
In April of 1999, the United States and China signed a new
bilateral aviation agreement (1999 Agreement) which increased
the flights between the two nations to 108 per week-fifty-four
per week per country, double the amount previously allowed-
by April of 2001.68 The 1999 Agreement allowed eight addi-
tional frequencies per week for existing U.S. incumbents begin-
ning in April 1999, nine additional frequencies per week for
existing U.S. incumbents beginning in April 2000, and ten new
weekly frequencies beginning in April 2001, at which time the
United States was allowed to designate a fourth passenger or
cargo airline to participate in serving the Chinese routes.'69 Ac-
cording to the agreement, additional frequencies must be oper-






168 U.S.-China Pact, TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 12, 1999, at 38. The April 1999 agree-
ment increased the number of flights between the United States and China from
twenty-seven to sixty-four in the short period from April 1999 to April 2000. Jo-
seph Lo, Further Consolidation on Way for Key Cariers, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 16, 1999, at 5.
169 Chris Kjelgaard, U.S. Incumbents to China Offered More Opportunities, AIR
TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE, Apr. 15, 1999.
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ated on either "Route A" or "Route B."'171 "Route A" allows U.S.
airlines to fly passenger/cargo or all-cargo flights from any point
in the United States to Beijing, Shanghai, or Guangzhou via To-
kyo or any other point in Japan.' 7 ' The more flexible "Route B"
allows a U.S. all-cargo carrier to fly from any point in the United
States to any point in China via any intermediate points. 172
The 1999 Agreement restricted U.S. carrier bids for the new
frequencies to the three carriers with prior rights to fly to
China-Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, and Federal Ex-
press. 173 Ani additional fourth passenger or cargo carrier was to
be selected in 2001.174 In 1999, the Department of Transporta-
tion awarded one new weekly flight to Federal Express, two to
United Airlines, and one to Northwest Airlines.'75 According to
the restrictive agreement, the U.S. government had to designate
either a second U.S. cargo carrier or a third U.S. passenger air-
line to serve the new China route that opened in 2001.176 The
Department of Transportation was forced to make an apples-to-
oranges comparison in determining whether the most profitable
choice for a new U.S. air carrier to offer service to China would
be a passenger carrier or an all-cargo carrier. 177 Delta Air Lines,
which lobbied to begin operating daily nonstop flights from
New York City to Beijing, and which would have marked the first
nonstop service between the United States and China, seemed
most likely to be awarded the new route. 178 American Airlines
also applied to begin passenger service on the new route, and
Polar Air Cargo applied to begin daily cargo service to China. 7 9




173 U.S.-China Pact, supra note 168, at 38.
174 Id.
175 DOT's Landmark Decision, J. CoM., Dec. 4, 2000, at 4.
176 Editorial, Airline Competition Over China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at A34.
President Clinton was unable to persuade Chinese negotiators to differentiate
between the two types of carriers for the 2001 route. Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Brooks & Power, supra note 3, at A3. The stakes in this bid for American
Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Postal Service were enormous, since the
Chinese historic reluctance to open itself to American airline service had resulted
in incumbent carriers enjoying a virtual monopoly over air service to China, and
it was unclear how long it would be before the Chinese government would allow
another U.S. carrier to begin offering U.S.-China service. Mathews & Cooper,
supra note 143, at Al.
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weekly frequencies along the new route to UPS, ending the mo-
nopoly that Federal Express had enjoyed over direct U.S.-China
cargo flights.18 ° The Department of Transportation chose UPS
to begin servicing the new route largely due to support from
more than 350 members of Congress, various state governors,
and the intense lobbying of the Teamsters union. 81
Although the 1999 agreement did not create "open skies" be-
tween the two nations as the United States had hoped, it did
expand the reach of the Chinese air transportation industry and
allowed for more cooperation and coordination with the U.S.
air industry. In 2004, U.S. and Chinese aviation officials began
negotiations to significantly liberalize air service between the
two countries."' The negotiations "effectively creat[ed] a re-
gional open skies within China." 183 While flights into major Chi-
nese cities would still be limited, the 2004 agreement between
the United States and China (2004 Agreement) removed many
of the restrictions on landing points outside the major Chinese
cities.18s Both the United States and China also agreed to hold
new discussions in 2006 that could possibly result in complete
180 DOT's Landmark Decision, supra note 175, at 4. Although they were not cho-
sen for the new route in 2000, American Airlines and Delta Air Lines negotiated
code-sharing arrangements with Chinese airlines, which were made possible
under prior bilateral agreements. Rick Brooks, UPS's Rights to China Flights Aren't
Contested, WALL ST.J., Dec. 20, 2000, at A6. American Airlines subsequently nego-
tiated with China Eastern Airlines, while Delta Air Lines negotiated with China
Southern Airlines in order to have access to the China market despite their loss
of the opportunity to fly a direct route under their own name. Id.
181 Brooks & Power, supra note 3, at A3. While the Teamsters Union initially
opposed the trade agreement with China altogether, UPS was able to earn their
support by arguing that UPS operation of direct cargo flights to China would
engender more than 1200 positions for Americans, almost all of which would be
filled by members of the Teamsters Union. Id. UPS was also the air carrier that
made the largest contributions to political candidates during the 2000 elections,
donating in excess of $1.2 million, more than three times the amount that Ameri-
can Airlines and Delta Air Lines contributed combined, according to the Center
for Responsive Politics. Id. UPS argued that the American public would benefit
greatly from increased competition with FedEx in the U.S.-China cargo industry
and that their route would offer the largest "economic punch" and enhance in-
ternational trade relations. Mathews & Cooper, supra note 143, at Al. American
and Delta countered that because they could offer both passenger and cargo
services, if awarded the route, they could enhance not only economic ties be-
tween the United States and China, but social ties as well. Id.
182 Caroline Daniel, U.S. and China Set for Deal on Air Services, FIN. TIMEs, June
15, 2004, at 1.
183 Id. at 2.
184 Id.
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liberalization. 8 5 The 2004 agreement allowed five additional
Chinese and five additional U.S. airlines to begin servicing the
U.S.-China air market directly between 2004 and 2010.186 As of
2004, U.S. carriers could offer a maximum of fifty-four weekly
flights to China.8 7 The 2004 Agreement allowed incumbent
carriers to operate fourteen additional passenger routes begin-
ning in August 2004 and seven additional frequencies to begin
operation in each year from 2005 to 2010.188 Federal Express
and UPS cargo flights were granted twenty-one new flights in
2004, eighteen in 2005, and seventy-two more by 2010.189
The U.S. Department of Transportation awarded United Air-
lines and Northwest Airlines seven additional weekly U.S.-China
frequencies each. 19 0 Beginning August 1, 2004, Northwest Air-
lines used its frequency to operate a daily flight between Detroit
and Guangzhou via Tokyo Narita Airport and United Airlines
used its frequency to operate a daily nonstop flight between Chi-
cago and Shanghai.' 9 ' The 2004 Agreement "also eliminates re-
strictions on destinations and permits unlimited code-sharing
between Chinese and U.S. airlines on any China-U.S. route.' 1
92
It also permits all-cargo U.S. carriers to establish hubs in China
by negotiating service and cooperation agreements with Chinese
airlines and airports. 93
Five U.S. airlines competed for the 2005 and 2006 routes to
China-Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, Continental Air-
lines, and low-fare carriers Hawaiian Airlines and North Ameri-
can Airlines.'94 United Airlines filed for the opportunity to fly
an additional passenger route, while Northwest Airlines only
filed for a future all-cargo route. 9 5 The U.S. airlines competed
intensely for the newly available route: American Airlines set up
a website, http://flyaatochina.com, where ordinary citizens and
185 Id.
186 United States, China Sign Agreement on Expanded Air Services, M2 PRESSWiRE,
July 26, 2004.
187 Daniel, supra note 182, at 1.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 United States, China Sign Agreement on Expanded Air Services, supra note 186.
191 Id.
192 William Dennis, Some Chinese Airlines Wary of New Bilateral with US, AVIATION
DAILY, July 27, 2004, at 4.
193 Id.
194 Jeremy W. Peters, Struggling Airlines Compete Fiercely for China Routes, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at C2.
195 [d.
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public officials could cite their support of American Airlines'
bid by sending supportive letters to the Department of Trans-
portation; Delta Air Lines provided a similar system on its web-
site which allowed the public to e-mail a form letter to the
Department of Transportation in support of Delta's bid.'96 Pub-
lic support for the route bid was enormous, especially in Dallas-
Fort Worth, where American Airlines cited the support of
twenty-six senators, seventy-eight house representatives, seven
governors, twenty-four mayors, and thirty-eight airports'97 in
favor of their proposed Dallas-Beijing route. The Department
of Transportation received in excess of 10,000 employee letters
in support of the bids from both Delta Air Lines and Continen-
tal Airlines. 9 Two passengers, however, attacked Continental's
plan to fly from Newark, stating that the New York area doesn't
need any more nonstop China service.' 99
The most recent bid for the China route to be opened in 2007
was awarded to United Airlines after an intense battle between
the four major U.S. carriers all vying for this lucrative route to
the fastest-growing business and trade market in Asia. 20 0 Begin-
ning March 25, 2007, United Airlines will offer daily nonstop
service from Washington Dulles International Airport in Wash-
ington, D.C., to Beijing Capital International Airport.2  United
Airlines' win will result in the first-ever direct flight between the
capitals of the United States and China.20 2 American Airlines
had proposed flying from Dallas-Fort Worth International Air-
port to Beijing, Continental Airlines had proposed an additional
flight connecting Newark and Shanghai, and Northwest Airlines
sought to offer service between Detroit and Shanghai. 20 ' Ameri-
196 Id.
197 Caroline Daniel, U.S. Airlines in for Long Haul to Crack the Chinese Puzzle: Ri-
vals Battle It Out for a Ticket to Provide Flights to a Market That Promises to Boom But
Has Yet to Pay, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2004, at 22.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Meckler & Carey, supra note 2, at A2. The bidding for the new route drew
more than 4000 letters and other documents to the Department of Transporta-
tion from the airlines, legislators, and even major retailers. Del Quentin Wilber
& Kim Hart, United Airlines Wins Right toFly to China from Dulles, WASH. POST, Jan.
10, 2007, at Al. Direct access to the China airline market would give the chosen
airline an impressive increase in possible customers, given China's population of
more than 1.2 billion people. Mathews & Cooper, supra note 143, at Al.
201 Meckler & Carey, supra note 2, at A2.
202 Id.
203 John Hughes &Jonathan D. Salant, U.S. Airlines in a Frenzy for Rights to New
China Route, INT'L HERALD TmB., Dec. 12, 2006, at 19.
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can Airlines appeared to be the front-runner in the bid, citing
voluminous corporate and consumer support for a direct flight
to China from Dallas-Fort Worth, 20 4 but a pilot dispute forced
American to significantly revise its route proposal, resulting in a
win for United. °5 The Department of Transportation ulti-
mately chose United Airlines' proposed flight from Washington,
D.C., which was the largest U.S. metropolitan area not already
served by a nonstop flight to China. 20 6 The United Airlines'
flights would serve the largest segment of the public because of
the available seating on its Boeing 747s.207 Connecting the
capitals also offers an opportunity to enhance the political and
economic ties between the two countries, 2 8 which is a very im-
portant consideration as China's airline industry becomes
stronger and more internationally viable.
V. PATH TO OPEN SKIES
For sixty years, the United States has encouraged nations to
adopt an expansive view of the rights of airlines to conduct in-
ternational air trade. If adopted, the principles advocated by
the United States, known as "freedoms of the air, ' 2°9 would facil-
itate international trade and tourism by acknowledging the
rights of airlines to participate in the air transport industry on
the basis of equal opportunity. 210
While the majority of international airline procedures are gov-
erned by typical bilateral aviation agreements, there has been a
recent global trend toward liberalization of air services. 2 1 The
United States has been the major promoter of "open skies"
204 Wilber & Hart, supra note 200, at Al.
205 Meckler & Carey, supra note 2, at A2.
206 Id.
207 Wilber & Hart, supra note 200, at Al.
208 Meckler & Carey, supra note 2, at A2.
209 The five "freedoms of the air" were defined as: (1) the right to fly and carry
traffic over a foreign nation without landing; (2) the right to land in foreign
nations for technical reasons; (3) the right of one nation's airline to land in an-
other nation and discharge passengers or cargo from the nation of origin; (4) the
right to board passengers or cargo abroad and fly to the nation of origin, and (5)
the right of one nation's airline to land and board passengers in a second nation,
then fly to a third nation where the passengers would disembark. Shadrach A.
Stanleigh, Note, "Excess Baggage" at the FAA: Analyzing the Tension Between "Open
Skies" and Safety Policing in U.S. International Civil Aviation Policy, 23 BROOK.J. INT'L
L. 965, 967 (1982).
210 Id.
211 Meyer, supra note 4, at 430.
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agreements, 212 which contrary to their convoluted bilateral
agreements, are almost completely devoid of restrictions on the
specifics of flights between the two nation parties to the treaty,
except for general safety and capacity guidelines. 213  Under
"open skies" agreements, determination of routes, which air-
lines will fly those routes, and how often airlines may fly those
routes, are left to free-market and competitive forces rather than
the governments of the nations involved.214 Essential to the con-
cept of "open skies" is the belief that the forces of the free mar-
ket and competition should predominate, not the rights of each
nation's sovereignty in their air space.21 5 While the United
States has followed this principle for nearly sixty years,21 a many
nations are not quite so willing to forgo sovereignty for the sake
of the market.
The main argument in support of "open skies" agreements is
that airlines should be permitted to alter their operations in re-
sponse to dynamic market conditions.21 7 By allowing the market
to govern airline ticket pricing, flight capacity, and route fre-
quency, airlines will be more responsive to the demands of pas-
sengers and will be able to offer more efficient and affordable
service. 2 8 The increased competition resulting from market,
rather than government, regulation will also contribute to in-
212 On Open Skies, see generally Adam L. Schless, Open Skies: Loosening the Pro-
tectionist Grip on International Civil Aviation, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 435, 446-451
(1994). While the exact meaning of the term "open skies" is subject to debate, at
a minimum it suggests an agreement that "includes open entry on routes, un-
restricted capacity and frequency on routes, and unrestricted traffic rights." Hed-
lund, supra note 110, at 263 n.22. More restrictive and regulatory agreements are
sometimes termed "closed skies" agreements. Id.
213 Meyer, supra note 4, at 430.
214 Id. The open skies policy of the United States, as defined in an August 1992
Department of Transportation Order, involves, among other things, unrestricted
capacity and frequency on all routes between the United States and the other
nation parties to the agreement, unrestricted code-sharing opportunities, and no
restrictions on intermediate and beyond points for flights between the two na-
tions. See In re Defining "Open Skies," Dep't of Transp. Order No. 92-8-13,
Docket No. 48130 (Aug. 5, 1992). Ease of negotiating open skies agreements as
opposed to bilateral aviation agreements is another selling point for the United
States. Under the "open skies" format, specific routes and destination cities
could be flexible and responsive, unlike the specifications under bilateral agree-
ments which require renegotiation before airlines from either nation party to the
agreement could respond to market forces or passenger preferences. Goo, supra
note 118, at 552.
215 Coo, supra note 118, at 551-52.
216 Id. at 552.
217 Meyer, supra note 4, at 430.
218 Id.
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creased industry growth in the nations involved. 2 " The U.S. air-
lines are strong proponents of "open skies" with other nations in
general, and with China in particular. In the past decade, the
Chinese airline industry has been steadily growing, and, as the
second largest trade partner with the United States, the poten-
tial for expansive growth is unprecedented.220
Nations that oppose "open skies" agreements counter that un-
regulated competition in the international air transportation in-
dustry would lead to great success for efficient foreign air
carriers in countries that are currently deregulated (such as the
United States) at the expense of obliterating many smaller air
carriers currently subsidized by national governments. 22' The
major U.S. airlines also oppose "open skies" agreements, but for
a very different reason-as it currently stands, four U.S. incum-
bent air carriers have a veritable oligopoly on the U.S.-China air
transport industry, and the competition engendered through
the introduction of new carriers into the market could result in
more expenses and less profit for the incumbents. 222
On October 14, 1992, the United States signed its first "open
skies" agreement with the Netherlands.223 The United States
subsequently signed similar "open skies" agreements with many
other nations, including Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and Iceland, with all nation parties agreeing that
market conditions would control all aspects of international
flights between the nations. 224 The United States has been at-
tempting to secure an "open skies" agreement with the Euro-
pean Union (EU) for several years, but the EU has been
reluctant to enter into such an agreement because of a general
feeling that the United States is not bargaining openly and fairly
with the major European countries. 225 As of 2006, U.S.-E.U. ne-
gotiations had progressed more liberally than ever before, but
219 See id.
220 Id. at 430-31.
221 Id. at 431.
222 Id.
223 Goo, supra note 118, at 552.
224 Benoit M.J. Swinnen, Comment, An Opportunity for Trans-Atlantic Civil Avia-
tion: From Open Skies to Open Markets?, 63J. AIR L. & COM. 249, 270 (1997).
225 Derek Lick, More Turbulence Ahead: A Bumpy Ride During U.S.-Japanese Avia-
tion Talks Exemplifies the Need for a Pragmatic Course in Future Aviation Negotiations,
31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1207, 1218 (1998). Open skies agreements among
European countries are uncommon because of the "protectionist policies imple-
mented by European governments," and the British government has stalled open
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reached a stalemate over the United States' refusal to allow for-
eigners to own more than twenty-five percent of the voting stock
in any air carrier or more than forty-nine percent of its total
stock. 22 6 However, once the United States and the European
Union are able to resolve this remaining issue, the result will be
a major step toward a fully liberalized market. The hope of the
U.S. government is that China, and other countries experienc-
ing major growth in international trade, will observe the model
agreement set by the United States and the European Union
and recognize that economic prosperity can stem from "open
skies" agreements.
By 2002, the United States had negotiated "open skies" agree-
ments with fifty-six nations, 227 yet China remains a notable ex-
ception. China has expressed the valid fear that an "open skies"
agreement, and the subsequent opening of the U.S.-China air
transport industry to market forces, would lead to some Chinese
airlines being forced out of the industry.228 Specifically, the Chi-
nese government has pointed to the fact that after U.S. deregu-
lation, a significant number of U.S. airlines, including the major
air carriers Pan American and Eastern Airlines, were forced out
of business because of their inability to adapt to the new com-
petitive standards in the deregulated market, while the carriers
who survived deregulation controlled the industry at a level ar-
guably even more concentrated than when the industry was
regulated.229
While Chinese airlines have suffered the reputation of having
unreliable, unsafe, and poor service in the past, the safety of the
Chinese airline industry has greatly improved since the disas-
trous era of the early 1990s. 2' 0 Although the Chinese govern-
ment concedes that an "open skies" agreement between the
United States and China may be a possibility in the future, they
have made it clear that such an agreement will not be formed
skies negotiations in an effort to protect its air carriers from "fierce international
competition." Id.
226 Laura Meckler & Daniel Michaels, Politics & Economics: Airlines "Open Skies"
Accord May Not Fly-U.S.-EU Pact is Delayed by Battle in Washington Over Foreign Con-
trol of Carriers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2006, at A4.
227 Meyer, supra note 4, at 437-38.
228 Id. at 439.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 440. Six hundred forty-two people died in Chinese air carrier crashes
during the period from 1989 to 1994, and two major Chinese airline accidents in
2002 have not aided the industry in removing the stigma as "the most dangerous
[airline] in the world." Id. at 440-41.
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until China is sure that the Chinese airlines will be adequately
protected and will be able to successfully compete on par with
the U.S. airline industry.231' The gradual approach that the U.S.
and Chinese airline industries have taken so far seems practical
and safe.232
VI. CONCLUSION
Air transportation between the United States and China is a
crucial factor in the success and efficiency of trade and tourism
in the two nations. While in decades past, restrictive bilateral
aviation agreements may have been preferable, and even benefi-
cial, to many nations, the increasing number of countries adopt-
ing "open skies" agreements has dramatically changed the
international aviation landscape. 33 Specifically, the current
framework of gradual amendments to bilateral aviation agree-
ments cannot sufficiently accommodate the rapidly changing
and growing needs of the U.S.-China air transportation industry,
and a more liberal and adaptable system of regulating the indus-
try is needed.23 4 An "open skies" agreement between China and
the United States should provide for market access and airline
capacity virtually free from restrictions, subject only to general
safety and antitrust principles.235 Such an arrangement has the
potential to greatly benefit both parties through increased air-
line competition and freedom from governmental interference.
If trade and business operations are to continue to expand be-
tween the United States and China, the airlines must be free to
fly where the market demands, without having to complete the
difficult and time-consuming process of negotiating and amend-
ing a bilateral agreement. However, acceptance of an open
skies agreement by China will only be possible if the U.S. gov-
ernment is sensitive to the qualms and reservations of the pro-
tective Chinese government with regard to the airline industry,
and if the Chinese government is willing to surrender some of
its control over the industry to the forces of the market and free
competition.
23, Gabriel S. Meyer, Recent Development, U.S.-China Aviation Relations, 36
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 227, 227 (2003).
232 Id. at 231-32.
233 Meyer, supra note 4, at 455-56.
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235 Id. at 298-99.
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